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Abstract
In the current study, we explored the effect of risk-assessment testimony, attributional
complexity, and victim type on participants’ perceptions of the dangerousness of a
sexually violent person and his need for treatment. Participants read details of a hypothetical sexual assault of a female minor and of an adult. Expert testimony of his risk
assessment consisted of clinical opinion versus structured-clinical judgment (SCJ)
versus actuarial assessment. Participants perceived clinical-opinion and SCJ testimony
as equally influential when forming judgments of future dangerousness. In the context
of treatment, however, participants relied on actuarial testimony when judging potential
for risk. In addition, attributional complexity (AC) moderated perceptions of sexual risk.
Overall, results point to the need for continued refinement of assessment techniques
when determining dangerousness and need for treatment.
Key words: risk assessment, expert testimony, future dangerousness
Overview
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court ruled that mental-health experts could testify
regarding the perceived dangerousness of a defendant (Barefoot v. Estelle, 1983).
Since this ruling, testimony addressing violence-risk assessment has generally been
presented in the form of clinical opinion, i.e., based on a clinician’s experience as a
practicing psychologist, without the use of standardized assessment instruments (Harris
& Lurigio, 2007). Recently, however, concern has emerged over the ability of clinical
opinion alone to accurately assess risk of violence (e.g., see Monahan, 2003). This
concern has led to the development of various assessment tools and techniques in
search of the best method for assessing risk. The methods currently utilized to assess
risk include: clinical opinion; actuarial instruments, which attach a specific statistical
weight to each factor assessing risk (Webster, Müller-Isberner, & Fransson 2002); and
structured-clinical judgment (SCJ), which integrates clinical judgment with riskassessment tools (Boer, Wilson, Gauthier & Hart, 1997; Melton, Petrila, Poythress, &
Slobogin, 2007; Murray & Thomson, 2010). In the current study, we examined the
differential impact of risk-assessment testimony consisting of clinical opinion, structuredclinical judgment, and the use of actuarial instruments on perceptions of a person’s
Gamache, K., Platania, J., & Zaitchik, M. (2013). Evaluating future dangerousness and need for
treatment: The roles of expert testimony, attributional complexity, and victim type. Open Access
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need for treatment and future dangerousness1 in the context of a sexual assault of a
female (adult versus minor) victim. In addition, we investigated the role of attributional
complexity—the ability to utilize complex attributional schemata—when evaluating
expert testimony and case facts (Fletcher, Danilovics, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986).
Finally, we explored the role of gender in light of the recent emergence of participant
gender as an important variable In "Sexually Violent Person" (SVP) trials (McCabe,
Krauss, & Lieberman, 2010; Guy & Edens, 2006).
Background
Over the last fifty years, states have evolved laws specifically directed towards criminals
who commit sexual crimes (Becker & Murphy, 1998). These SVP statutes have
outlined the framework for a finding of “sexual dangerousness,” which allows for the
containment of sexual offenders in treatment facilities upon release from prison. These
types of laws, as well as those that establish community-warning programs, have been
enacted in 20 states (Boccaccini, Murrie, Hawes, Simpler, & Johnson, 2010; Fitch &
Hammen, 2002; Gookin, 2007; In re Young, 1993). Although each jurisdiction defines
“sexually violent” somewhat differently, all SVP laws require the individual to possess
both a mental abnormality and the potential of future risk of re-offense (Schwartz, 1999).
In many instances, definitions of mental abnormality require the individual to have a
diagnosable mental disorder listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the APA, such
as paraphilia, or other disorders that increase likelihood of sexual recidivism (Becker &
Murphy, 1998).
Throughout the years, a growing number of cases involving the commitment of SVPs
have been challenged, as in the case of Leroy Hendricks (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997).
Hendricks had been imprisoned for repeatedly molesting children. When he was
scheduled for release, the state of Kansas sought to commit him under the Kansas SVP
Act. The Kansas SVP Act allows for the civil commitment of an offender if the presence
of a mental abnormality or personality disorder renders it likely the individual would reoffend. Hendricks appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld his
confinement. The Court ruled that a sexual offender committed to a treatment facility
could be held beyond his sentence without violating his Fifth-Amendment rights. Most
states following the Kansas law have identified the following criteria necessary for
consideration prior to committing a sexual offender: a history of sexual offending, the
presence of a mental abnormality, an inability to control his or her actions and a
significant risk for sexual offending in the future (Boccaccini, Murrie, Caperton, &
Hawes, 2009).
In 2002, however, the Supreme Court revisited the “mental abnormality” consideration
required by the Kansas statute in Kansas v. Crane. Specifically, the state of Kansas
sought to have Crane placed in a treatment facility even though he did not meet the
criteria for mental illness as defined by the State. The Court ruled that the Kansas SVP
law could be applied to defendants not experiencing significant impairment or total lack
of control over their actions. This ruling allowed a broader application for SVP
1

In the current study, the term future dangerousness is used synonymously with continued threat.
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commitment than civil-commitment laws with respect to the mentally ill. Currently, 14 of
20 states allowing the involuntary commitment of sexually dangerous persons permit
the right to a jury trial to assess the dangerousness of the defendant (Rush & Gransee,
2010). With over 4,500 individuals confined under current commitment laws, there is a
high demand for accurate methods to assess dangerousness in sexually violent
offenders (Sbraga, 2004).
Risk Assessment
Dynamic v. Static Factors. Expert testimony addressing violent and sexual recidivism
typically relies on risk factors associated with the offender and the offense. These risk
factors are commonly divided into two groups: static and dynamic (Conroy, 2003; Hanson & Bussiere 1998; Hanson & Harris, 2000). Static risk factors are defined as fixed or
historical characteristics of an offender, such as offender age, offense history, age at
first offense, and victim characteristics. Conversely, dynamic risk factors are identified
as characteristics that can change over time, such as anger control methods, substance
abuse, and social networks. Dynamic risk factors are divided into two subgroups: stable
and acute. Stable factors should remain relatively unchanged, whereas acute dynamic
factors can change rapidly. Sex-offender recidivism has been associated with stable
dynamic factors such as positive social support, deviant sexual interests, use of alcohol
and illegal substances, and victim access (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; Hanson & Harris,
2000; 2001). Acute dynamic factors include intoxication and sexual arousal. Research
addressing the predictive utility of dynamic and static risk factors reveals important yet
disparate findings. For example, results of a meta-analysis conducted by Hanson and
Bussiere (1998), found that static risk factors were the best predictors of long-term recidivism. On the other hand, research finds identifying dynamic risk factors most useful
in predicting future violence (Conroy, 2003). Research concerning the ability of dynamic factors to predict sexual recidivism reveals inconsistent findings, with some studies
demonstrating that dynamic factors are good predictors of sexual recidivism while others find that dynamic risk factors can predict general criminal recidivism but not sexual
recidivism (Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996; Hanson & Harris, 2000; Hanson, Scott, &
Steffy, 1995; Lindsey, Elliot, & Astell, 2004). Hanson and Harris (2000) found that victim access, anger, and unwillingness to cooperate with individuals in authority/supervisory positions were the most reliable predictors of recidivism. This assessment was made among the acute factors studied by the researchers, explaining, “most
of the factors that were stable risk factors were also acute risk predictors” (p. 23). Regardless of the label allocated to these factors, assessment of sex-offender recidivism
should include both static and dynamic factors.
Expert Testimony. Although increasing numbers of clinicians are offering testimony
regarding violence-risk assessment, there is considerable debate regarding the accuracy of the various methods used to determine potential for risk (see Murray & Thomson, 2010 for a review). That said, the methods currently utilized to assess risk include:
clinical opinion; actuarial instruments, which attach a specific statistical weight to each
factor assessing risk; and structured-clinical judgment, which combines the use of assessment tools with clinical judgment (Melton, et al., 2007; Murray & Thomson, 2010;
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Webster, 2002). Each method’s strengths and weaknesses have been thoroughly reviewed with respect their ability to assess potential for risk.
Clinical opinion. Clinical-opinion testimony, sometimes known as unstructured-clinical
judgment/opinion, is the evaluation of an individual without the explicit use of risk factors
or other tools. In clinical-opinion testimony, the determination of a defendant’s
dangerousness is made at the discretion of the expert (Dempster, 2003; Hanson, 1998).
According to research (Elbogen & Huss, 2000), the context in which the evaluation is
made may often affect the type of risk factors considered. In terms of the clinical
interview, this suggests a reliance on salient cues (e.g., delusions) when assessing risk
(Quinsey, 1995).
Other researchers have found that clinicians base their
recommendations on a history of violence, alcohol use, and level of anger more often
than cues (Menzies & Webster, 1995). Supporters of this assessment method contend
that its greatest strength is the freedom it allows evaluators, who can tailor each
assessment to the individual (Dolan & Doyle, 2000). The clinical-opinion method has
been heavily criticized, however, for such factors as ignoring base-rate data, assigning
too much power to certain factors while ignoring others, the lack of rules or criteria
governing the decision making, susceptibility to attributional errors, poor interrater
reliability, and low accuracy and consistency (Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Grove & Meehl,
1996; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Hanson, 2009; Hanson, 2002;
Krauss, Lieberman, & Olson, 2004). Others have claimed that clinical opinion is no
more accurate than the judgments of intelligent laypersons (Quinsey & Ambtman,
1979).
Actuarial instruments. Actuarial assessment relies on the use of actuarial instruments
in predicting future dangerousness (Hanson, 2002). These instruments evaluate an
offender on a number of static factors, and are then combined into a total score. The
score yields a determination of risk labeled as “low,” “moderate,” or “high” (Douglas &
Skeem, 2005). The guidelines for determining risk are often very specific, offering little
clinical interpretation (Yang, Wong, & Coid, 2010). Actuarial instruments have been
slated as the most cost-effective manner of risk assessment (Beech, Fisher, &
Thornton, 2003). Although actuarial assessments are viewed by some as superior to
clinical opinion (Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998), there is still a great deal of
debate over their use in cases involving SVPs. In fact, predominant criticisms include
the inability of actuarial instruments to accurately illustrate a specific individual’s amount
of risk. Thus, overreliance on actuarial instruments may lead evaluators to ignore other
factors of risk and the failure to provide recommendations for treatment objectives
(Beech, et al., 2003).
Structured-clinical judgment. Structured-clinical-judgment testimony (SCJ), also
referred to as guided-professional-judgment (GPJ) testimony, was developed to
combine the expertise of clinical professionals with particular aspects of actuarial
measures (Lieberman, Krauss, Kyger, & Lehoux, 2007). These judgments are based
on empirically derived risk factors as well as clinical opinion regarding the defendant’s
presentation of these risk factors (Dempster, 2003; Dolan & Doyle, 2000). The Sexual
Violence Risk-20-R (SVR-20-R) (Boer, Hart, Kropp, & Webster, 1997) is the most widely
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used statistical tool utilized in this assessment method. The SVR-20-R measures future
risk potential of sexual offenses and has been found to be one of the few predictive
measures that not only predict future violence, but also sexual recidivism (Dempster &
Hart, 2002). This method allows some freedom in judgment while still adhering to
guidelines that aid in accuracy. Following this method, clinicians examine both static
and dynamic factors, with emphasis on dynamic factors. Risk factors are evaluated with
respect to the individual as opposed to the population of sex offenders (Dempster,
2003; Douglas & Skeem, 2005). Structured-clinical judgment has also been shown to
be accurate and reliable (Dempster, 2003). Recent research finds increasing support
for the structured-clinical-judgment model in assessing risk of violence (Maden, 2005;
Singh, 2008). For example, field data examined on 107 Danish patients five years after
discharge from forensic/psychiatric settings indicate that the structured-professionaljudgment model of risk assessment utilizing the Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20
scale (HCR-20) had the highest predictive accuracy of violent recidivism for future
violence compared to utilizing the HCR-20 solely in an actuarial manner (Pedersen,
Rasmussen, & Elsass, 2010).
Perceptions of Assessment Testimony
Results of empirical studies investigating the impact of different types of expert
testimony assessing risk of violence have demonstrated less clear-cut findings than
data obtained in the aforementioned field study. For example, in a recent study
investigating the effect of the type of testimony on determinations of future
dangerousness, researchers found higher levels of verdict confidence among
venirepersons exposed to clinical opinion than among those exposed to actuarial
testimony (Krauss, McCabe, & Lieberman, 2011). In addition, contrary to the
researchers’ predictions, rational information processors exposed to clinical testimony
reported greater verdict confidence than those exposed to actuarial testimony.
Experiential processors on the other hand, reported greater verdict confidence after
hearing actuarial testimony than those who heard clinical testimony. In an earlier study
on a sample of undergraduate students, researchers observed this effect in the
predicted direction, however, only after individuals were encouraged to think rationally
(Lieberman, et al., 2007). Namely, participant-jurors instructed to think about the case
rationally were significantly more influenced by actuarial testimony than by clinical and
guided-professional judgment (GPJ) testimony. Alternatively, experiential processors
reported higher levels of perceived defendant dangerousness when exposed to clinical
testimony. However, this effect was seen only for male participants. It was interesting
that, regardless of processing mode, participants did not differentiate between GPJ and
clinical testimony on ratings of dangerousness. This study appears to be the first to
examine the differential effects of clinical-opinion, actuarial, and structured-clinical
judgment testimony on evaluations of SVPs in the context of civil commitment.
Guy and Edens (2003) examined the effect of different types of expert-witness
testimony (clinical-opinion testimony versus actuarial-assessment testimony) and the
expert's assessment of the defendant (no ‘psychopath’ label versus the label of
‘psychopath’) on participants’ perceptions of the defendant's dangerousness in a mock
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SVP commitment hearing. In this study, participants were more likely to believe a
defendant would commit future sexual violence if labeled a high-risk psychopath. This
effect was more pronounced for females than for males. Namely, females were more
likely to favor commitment than males were, particularly when the defendant was
described as a psychopath. It is interesting that the researchers did not observe a
difference between the clinical and actuarial conditions. This finding differed from a
previous study examining differences between clinical and actuarial assessment
testimony in the context of a capital trial (Krauss & Sales, 2001). In this study, clinicalopinion testimony was perceived as more accurate and more reliable than actuarial
instruments in evaluating future dangerousness. Clinical-opinion testimony was also
rated more favorably among participant-jurors than was actuarial-expert testimony.
Krauss and colleagues (2010) found notable differences in perceptions of aspects of an
SVP trial between a sample of undergraduate students and jury-eligible community
members. Community members were more confident in their decision to commit.
Commitment decisions for this group were also influenced by clinical-opinion testimony
compared to actuarial testimony. Students, on other hand, were influenced more by
actuarial testimony than by clinical testimony, which the researchers attributed to the
rational cognitive processing style of students.
In 2006, Guy and Edens examined the role of victim type in the context of an SVP trial.
In two separate sexual-assault scenarios, the researchers manipulated the age of the
female victim as being 8 or 10 years old or 20 or 27 years old. In addition, they
examined the effect that the type of testimony (clinical opinion versus actuarial
testimony) and the presence of the “psychopath” label had on participants’ assessment.
Results indicated that, regardless of the type of testimony, participants overwhelmingly
decided in favor of commitment in the child-victim condition. This finding was consistent
for both male and female participants. In light of this finding, the researchers suggest
future studies examine other aspects of a sexual-assault scenario (e.g., victim gender,
level of seriousness of assault).
Attribution and Decision Making
Attribution theory. Attribution theory examines the relation between individuals’
thoughts and behaviors and their interpretation of surrounding events (Heider, 1958).
Accordingly, attribution theory has offered a new perspective in understanding research
in the legal/forensic decision-making context.
Specifically, results of studies
investigating the role of attribution in this context have increased awareness of the
importance of individual difference characteristics in the legal/forensic arena. Early
research in this area uncovered a relationship between internal attributions and parole
decisions (Carroll, 1978). In this study, the researcher found that parole-board
decisions were significantly more influenced by attributions based on the parolee’s
internal characteristics than by case-specific factors. In a follow-up study, the
researcher found that members of a parole board were less likely to grant parole to
offenders whose crimes were attributed to internal factors than to external factors
(Carroll, 1979). Supporting this finding, Cullen, Clark, Cullen, and Mathers (1985)
demonstrated that individuals were more likely to favor rehabilitation over punishment if
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an offender's crimes were linked to external factors rather than to internal attributions.
In a later study, researchers found a strong relationship among causal attributions, juror
attitudes, and sentencing decisions (Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987).
Results indicated that participants assigning internal attributions to verdicts of guilt also
assigned harsher sentences than did participants allocating external attributions to guilty
verdicts. A recent study addressed attribution as a key moderator in understanding
decision making in the context of a hate crime (Cramer, Chandler, & Wakeman, 2010).
These researchers found a relation between blame attribution and punitiveness in a
series of studies addressing perceptions of sexually oriented hate crimes with greater
victim blame associated with less punitive punishment for the defendant. When
examining mock-jury deliberations in a capital case involving child abuse, Stevenson,
Bottoms, and Diamond (2010) found participant-jurors’ use of stable attributions to
conceptualize the defendant’s behavior strongly indicative of pro-prosecution sentiment.
Lupfer, Cohen, Bernard, Smalley, and Schipperman (1985) found similar results in the
context of a civil trial. In this study, anti-plaintiff bias appeared to be guided by
perceptions of negative stereotypes and hostile intentions rather than stable attributions.
Attributional complexity. In 1986, researchers conceptualized the construct of
attributional complexity (Fletcher, et al., 1986). They reasoned that individuals differ
both in their preference for how to explain behavior and in their motivation to do so.
These differences are the result of how we respond to and evaluate information as a
function of our attributional schemata, with some individuals organizing and interpreting
stimuli at a higher, more detailed level than others. To measure this concept of
“attributional complexity” Fletcher and colleagues (1986) created the Attributional
Complexity Scale (ACS). The 28-item scale assesses attributional complexity across
seven factors or constructs:
• level of interest/motivation
• preference for complex rather than simple explanations
• presence of metacognition concerning explanations
• behavior as a function of interaction with others
• tendency to infer abstract/complex internal attributions
• tendency to infer contemporary external attributions
• tendency to infer external causes from past experiences.
The idea is that individuals who are more (less) complex on one “attributional
dimension” will be more (less) complex on the other dimensions (p. 876-877).
Research has demonstrated that individual differences in attributional complexity
influence judgments and decision-making. For example, high levels of AC have been
found to be associated with high levels of perspective taking and empathic concern
(Joireman, 2004). Alternatively, low levels of AC have been related to endorsing
punitive rather than rehabilitation models as well as perceptions of subtle racism (Reid
& Foels, 2010; Tam, Au, & Leung, 2008). In addition, individuals with relatively complex
attributional schemata have been found to spend a considerable amount of time
reflecting on more cognitively challenging problems rather than on less challenging
ones (Fletcher, Rosanowski, Rhodes, & Lange, 1992). High AC individuals also use
this reflection time wisely—forming more accurate judgments not only in solving
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complex discrimination tasks but also in accurately determining the personality
characteristics of others (Fletcher, Reeder, & Bull, 1990). Finally, attributionally
complex individuals are selective regarding the criteria they use to form attributions.
They select not only more information but also more useful information in analyzing
causal attributions than attributionally simple individuals do (Murphy, 1994).
Attributional complexity has also been shown to influence various aspects of legal
decision-making. In the context of a simulated armed robbery, Pope and Meyer (1999)
found that attributionally complex jurors were significantly more likely to consider
external factors for the defendant’s behavior than attributionally simple jurors were. In
addition, Pope and Meyer found gender differences with respect to such measures as
verdict, confidence, and witness credibility. Compared to females, male participants
were significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty, report more confidence in their
verdict preference, and view the eyewitness as more credible. It is interesting that
these researchers included an attributionally average group in addition to high and low
AC groups. While results indicated this group’s tendency to interpret the evidence in
much the same manner as the high AC group, they appeared to distinguish themselves
as a separate group based on the seven subscales of the ACS. In a rather interesting
experimental setting, Lassiter and colleagues (2005) examined the moderating effects
of AC on susceptibility to camera perspective bias in the context of a videotaped
“confession. Although they observed differences2 in verdict as a function of attributional
complexity, attributionally simple and attributionally complex participants did not differ
with respect to their assessments of the voluntariness of a confession as measured by
camera perspective. The authors account for this finding by suggesting a different type
of information processing involved in assessing camera perspective bias compared to
verdict determinations. Nonetheless, this study as well as others provides important
insights into the moderating effects of attributional complexity in a broad range of legal
and clinical circumstances.
The Present Study
Currently, only one study has empirically examined perceptions of the relative efficacy
of clinical-opinion, actuarial, and guided-professional judgment (GPJ) expert testimony
in the context of future dangerousness and civil commitment (Lieberman, et al., 2007).
In that study, researchers found that perceptions of clinical opinion and GPJ testimony
generally did not differ.3 Considering the importance of determining the most efficient
form of expert testimony in civil-commitment hearings of SVPs, more research needs to
be conducted in this area. That said, the current study examines the influence of
differing types of expert testimony4 on perceptions of future dangerousness and need
for confinement in a SVP civil-commitment hearing in which the defendant is considered
a moderate risk for recidivism amidst charges of voyeurism, sexual assault, and
breaking and entering. In addition, we were interested in the moderating effects of
2

Differences reported by researchers as nearly significant: p = .08 (p. 31).
Differences were observed as a function of cognitive processing mode (rational v. experiential).
4
Modeled after Lieberman, et al., (2007)—clinical-opinion, actuarial assessment, and guided-professional
judgment.
3
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attributional complexity on perceptions of risk potential. An empirical examination of the
combined effects of different types of expert testimony and attributional complexity in
this context has the potential to offer more specific insights into how individual
differences in attributional schemata contribute to our understanding of perceptions of
SVPs. In view of the research demonstrating that individuals with complex attributional
schemata are more efficient information processors than those with relatively simple
schemata, we examined how individual differences in AC influenced participants’ use of
expert testimony when evaluating the defendant as well as case facts. Within this
paradigm, we also varied victim type as female adult victim versus minor victim.
Previous research examining the role of victim type in the context of a SVP trial found
that, regardless of type of testimony, participants overwhelmingly decided in favor of
commitment in the child-victim condition (Guy & Edens, 2006). In light of this finding,
the researchers suggest that future studies examine other aspects of a sexual-assault
scenario (e.g., victim gender, level of seriousness of assault). As a result, we decided
to gauge level of seriousness of sexual assault by having the defendant hold the victim
(adult and minor) at knifepoint. Finally, we explored the role of participant gender
considering the recent emergence of this variable as an important factor in studies
examining perceptions of dangerousness (Foels & Reid, 2010; Guy & Edens, 2006;
2003; Lieberman et al., 2007).
Accordingly, in a 2 (Victim Type: Adult v. Minor) x 3 (Expert Testimony: StructuredClinical Judgment v. Clinical v. Actuarial) between-subjects design, the current study
investigated (1) participant-jurors’ preference for structured-clinical-judgment testimony
over clinical opinion and actuarial testimony when determining need for treatment and
future dangerousness in an SVP trial, (2) the moderating effects, if any, of attributional
complexity on perceptions of the defendant, (3) the role of victim type in perceptions of
the defendant, and (4) whether and to what extent gender differences exist in
determinations of need for treatment and future dangerousness.
Method
Participants
Two hundred forty-five undergraduate students participated as part of a course
requirement or for extra credit (88 men, 157 women). Participants were at least 18
years of age, registered voters, and predominantly Caucasian (91%).
Materials and Procedure
Pre-Trial Materials.
Prior to administering the stimulus materials, participants
responded to items assessing basic demographic information (age, gender, class year,
ethnicity, and jury eligibility). In addition, they completed the 28-item Attributional
Complexity Scale (Fletcher et al., 1986). After completing these items, and prior to
reading the expert testimony in the case, participants read one of two 400-word
summaries describing events leading to the defendant’s arrest. See Appendix for
summary of case facts. All participants then read a one-sentence explanation of state
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law (Massachusetts) allowing for the confinement of sexually dangerous persons
beyond their prison terms in a clinical institution.
Trial Materials. Participants then read one of three trial transcripts of the direct and
cross-examination of expert testimony (clinical opinion v. structured-clinical judgment v.
actuarial). The following aspects of the expert testimony remained constant across all
experimental scenarios: (1) expert’s background, experience, and education, (2)
description of the offender as having a “moderate risk” of re-offending, and (3)
discussion of the likelihood of the defendant re-offending and being a continuing danger
to society.
Structured-Clinical Judgment (SCJ). In the structured-clinical-judgment condition, the
expert utilized the SVR-20-R5 in characterizing the offender’s potential for future risk.
The expert identified static factors including relationship problems, employment
problems, and factors involving the defendant’s crimes. Dynamic factors included
interpersonal issues and sexual deviancy. Clinical-risk factors included minimizing the
consequences of his actions to the victim, lack of long-term plans, and resistance to
treatment, also emphasizing that the presence of these factors increases the likelihood
of recidivism. In his testimony, the expert stated that he had reviewed the defendant’s
criminal and medical records. He also stated that he had held two two-hour interviews
with the defendant at the prison
Actuarial. In the actuarial condition, the expert utilized the Static-20026 as the
foundation for his opinion of the defendant. He described the instrument as a reliable
and valid measure assessing recidivism based on risk factors. He indicated the
defendant scored “4,” earning one point each for the following: conviction for a prior sex
offense, non-contact prior sexual offense, breaking and entering during the crime, and
assault on an unrelated victim, stating the defendant “has a 26% chance of recidivating
in the next five years, increasing to 31% after ten years and 36% after fifteen years.”
Clinical Opinion. In the clinical-opinion condition, the expert relied on a series of
interviews with the defendant. The interviews consisted of discussion of the defendant’s
social history, the events of the crimes, and his thoughts and feelings. He discussed
the defendant’s deviant sexual fantasies and attachments, stating that he specifically
received and acted upon sexual thrills from stalking unsuspecting women. The expert
5

The SVR-20-R consists of a checklist of twenty items categorized as: psychosocial adjustment, sexual
offenses and future plans. Each item is assessed on a 3-point scale from 0 to 2 (Boer, et al, 1997).
6
The Static-2002 actuarial instrument (Hanson & Thornton, 2003) has recently replaced the widely
accepted Static-99 (Hanson & Thornton, 1999). The goal of the revised scale was to develop a reliable
assessment of risk in predicting sexual recidivism. The variables chosen for the scale were a function of
factors associated with sex-offense recidivism presented in research findings (e.g., Hanson & Bussière,
1998). The 13 items represent the following five categories: age at release, sex offense history, deviant
sexual interests, availability of victims, general criminality with higher scores indicative of greater risk.
Research with the Static-2002 has demonstrated moderate to high accuracy with respect to its predictive
ability (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2009). Research has also reported moderate-to-high interrater
reliability (Langton, Barbaree, Hansen, Harkins, & Peacock, 2007).
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also described the defendant as possessing poor skills in developing interpersonal
relationships, showing little understanding for the assault on the victim, failing to
appreciate the damage caused by such an attack, frequently finding excuses for his
actions.
Cross-examination. The cross-examination by the defense attorney illustrated the
common drawbacks of each type of testimony. Specifically, in the cross-examination of
actuarial testimony, the expert was questioned on the predictive ability of the Static2002 with respect to re-offending and the instrument’s inability to consider specific
dynamic factors related to recidivism. In the cross-examination of the structuredclinical-opinion testimony, the expert was questioned on several factors related to
psychosocial behaviors and sexual offenses not present in the defendant (e.g., mental
illness, suicidal and/or homicidal tendencies, anti-social behavior, substance abuse
problems). Other factors included multiple victims, violence, and increase of frequency
and severity of sex offenses. Finally, the cross-examination of the clinical-opinion
expert questioned the prediction accuracy considering the relatively few interviews
conducted with the defendant.
Transcripts ranged in length from 1,200 to 1,400 words, depending on testimony. After
reading the requisite testimony, all participants read the following definition of Sexually
Dangerous Persons taken from the Massachusetts statute:
Sexually dangerous person—any person who has been (i) convicted of or
adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a
sexual offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not
confined to a secure facility; (ii) charged with a sexual offense and was
determined to be incompetent to stand trial and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes such person likely to
engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility; or (iii)
previously adjudicated as such by a court of the Commonwealth and
whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of power to
control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive
sexual misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression
against any victim under the age of 16 years, and who, as a result, is likely
to attack or otherwise inflict injury on such victims because of his
uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires (Mass. Gen Law., Title 17, Chap
123. Section 1).
Post-Trial Materials. At the completion of the trial stage, participants completed two
primary items of interest: The first item measured participants’ belief that the defendant
should be placed in a clinical facility after serving his sentence. The second measured
participants’ belief that the defendant would be a continuing threat to society. In
addition, participants responded to a series of items designed to assess the perceptions
of expert testimony, case facts, the role of treatment in re-offending, and defendant
characteristics.
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Items. Unless otherwise indicated, all items were measured using a 6-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (completely). Following are the two items measuring perceptions of need for confinement and future dangerousness: “Do you believe that
the defendant should be placed in a clinical facility after his sentence is served?” “Do
you believe that the defendant will be a continuing threat to society?” Additional items
in our analyses included: “If the defendant does/does not participate in treatment, how
likely is it that he will commit a sexual crime in the future?” “How much of your opinion
on Mr. Cooke’s sexual-risk potential was influenced by the expert?” “How credible was
the expert?”
After signing the consent form, participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental scenarios. They then completed the pre-trial instruments, read the state statute
defining sexually dangerous persons and expert testimony, and completed all dependent measures. Participation required 20 minutes.
Results
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our sample on all dependent measures.
Table 1
Descriptive data on all dependent measures
Item

Mean

SD

The defendant should be placed in a clinical facility
The defendant is a continuing threat to society.a
Likelihood of committing a sexual crime without treatment
Likelihood of committing a sexual crime with treatment
Rating of expert credibility
Opinion of sexual risk potential influenced by expert testimony
Opinion of sexual risk potential influenced by case facts

4.96
4.75
5.02
3.33
4.93
4.22
4.88

.98
.92
.93
1.06
.93
1.06
.84

Note: N = 245
a
This item’s responses ranged from 2 to 6. Remaining items ranged from 1 to 6.
Preliminary Analyses
Two separate Chi-square analyses were conducted to examine the distribution of male
and female participants among our treatment conditions. No significant associations
were found between gender and expert testimony conditions: χ2(2, N = 245) = .64, p =
.73, Cramer’s V = .05; and gender and victim type: χ2(1, N = 245) = .31, p = .57, phi = .04. According to these results, gender distribution among our experimental conditions
appeared to be equivalent.
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Attributional Complexity Scale Analysis
After recoding, internal consistency of the 28-item ACS revealed Cronbach’s alpha =
.90. Individual item responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
Aggregate responses to the 28-item ACS ranged from 82 – 167, M = 126.63, Md =
126.00, SD = 16.14. Based on a median split, and in order to examine this factor as a
moderator, we dichotomized responses into low AC (82 – 126) and high AC (127 –
167). Low AC participants composed 51% of our sample (N = 124); high AC
participants composed 49% of our sample (N = 121). Consistent with research
(Fletcher et al., 1986; Foels & Reid, 2010) females (M = 129.11, SD = 15.12) were
significantly more attributionally complex than males (M = 121.92, SD = 17.09): t(243) =
-3.46, p = .001. See Table 2 for the 28-item ACS.
Table 2
Mean Responses to ACS items
Item
I don’t usually bother to analyze and explain people’s behavior.
Once I have figured out a single cause for a person’s behavior I don’t
usually go any further.
I believe it is important to analyze and understand our own thinking
process.
I think a lot about the influence that I have on other people’s behavior.
I have found that relationships between a person’s attitudes, beliefs, and
character traits are usually simple and straightforward.
I see people behaving in a really strange or unusual manner, I usually put
it down to the fact that they are strange or unusual people and don’t
bother to explain it any further.
I have thought a lot about the family background and personal history of
people who are close to me, in order to understand why they are the sort
of people they are.
I don’t enjoy getting into discussions where the causes for people’s
behavior are discussed.
I have found that the causes for people’s behavior are usually complex
rather than simple.
I am very interested in understanding how my own thinking works when I
make judgments about people or attach causes to their behavior.
I think very little about the different ways that people influence each other.
To understand a person’s personality/behavior I have found it is important
to know how that person’s attitudes, beliefs, and character traits fit
together.
When I try to explain other people’s behavior I concentrate on the other
person and don’t worry too much about all the existing external factors
that might be affecting them.
I have often found that the basic cause for a person’s behavior is located
far back in time.
I really enjoy analyzing the reasons or causes for people’s behavior.
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Mean

SD

4.79
4.29

1.02
1.22

5.06

.927

4.46
4.46

1.00
1.00

4.59

1.21

4.48

1.19

4.45

1.28

4.93

.991

4.79

1.09

4.72
4.70

1.06
.931

4.52

1.08

3.67

1.19

4.22

1.28
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I find that complicated explanations for people’s behavior are confusing
rather than helpful.
I give little thought to how my thinking works in the process of
understanding or explaining people’s behavior.
I think very little about the influence that other people have on my
behavior.
I have thought a lot about the way that different parts of my personality
influence other parts.
I think a lot about the influence that society has on other people.
When I analyze a person’s behavior I often find the causes form a chain
that goes back in time, sometimes for years.
I am not really curious about human behavior.
I prefer simple rather than complex explanations for people’s behavior.
When the reasons I give for my own behavior are different from someone
else’s, this often makes me think about the thinking processes that lead to
my explanations.
I believe that to understand a person you need to understand the people
who that person has close contact with.
I tend to take people’s behavior at face value and not worry about the
inner causes for their behavior (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, etc.).
I think a lot about the influence that society has on my behavior and
personality.
I have thought very little about my own family background and personal
history in order to understand why I am the sort of person I am.

4.07

1.15

4.40

1.16

4.64

1.14

4.41

1.07

4.85
4.18

1.00
1.15

4.87
4.09
4.15

1.35
1.32
1.08

4.59

1.00

4.70

1.05

4.55

1.03

4.88

1.22

Note: N = 245. Responses scaled from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
Two separate Chi-square analyses were conducted to examine the distribution of high
and low AC participants among our treatment conditions. No significant associations
were found between AC and expert-testimony conditions: χ2(2, N = 245) = 2.54, p = .28,
Cramer’s V = .10; and AC and victim type: χ2(1, N = 245) = .19, p = .65, phi = -.03.
According to these results, the distribution of high and low AC participants among our
experimental conditions appeared to be equivalent.
Need for commitment. We tested the influence of our manipulated factors as well as
AC on evaluations of need for commitment and determination of future dangerousness
through two separate three-way ANOVAs—expert Testimony (Clinical Opinion v.
Actuarial v. Structured-Clinical Judgment - SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) x AC
(Low v. High). On evaluations of need for commitment, a significant testimony x victimtype interaction was found: F(2, 233) = 6.82, p = .001, hp2= .05. Participants were most
likely to believe the defendant should be placed in a clinical facility in the clinical-opinion
testimony/adult victim condition. Alternatively, they were least likely to believe the
defendant should be placed in a facility in the actuarial testimony/adult victim condition.
See Figure 1 for graphic explanation of this finding. In addition, a main effect for type of
testimony was observed: F(2, 233) = 5.47, p = .005, hp2= .04. Participants in the
clinical-opinion-testimony condition were significantly more likely to believe the
defendant should be placed in a clinical facility compared to the actuarial-testimony
condition (Clinical: M = 5.25, SD = .79 v. Actuarial: M = 4.75, SD = 1.15). SCJ
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testimony did not differ significantly from either of these conditions (M = 4.93, SD = .91).
We did not observe a main effect for type of victim on perceptions of need for
commitment nor did we find any significant effects of AC on this item.
Figure 1: Expert Testimony x Victim Type Interaction on Perceptions of Need for
Commitment
5.65
5.45
5.25
5.05

Adult

4.85

Child

4.65
4.45
4.25
Actuarial

SCJ

Clinical
Opinion

Future dangerousness. A second three-way ANOVA was conducted on participants’
evaluations of the defendant as a continued threat to society: Expert Testimony (Clinical
Opinion v. Actuarial v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) x AC (Low v. High). A main
effect of type of testimony was found: F(2, 233) = 10.41, p< .001, h2= .08. Clinicalopinion and SCJ testimony differed significantly from actuarial instruments when
assessing continued threat. Scheffé’s test of multiple comparisons revealed the
following: Clinical Opinion (M = 5.06, SD = .75) SCJ (M = 4.78, SD = .91) v. Actuarial (M
= 4.42, SD = .97). Participants did not differentiate between clinical-opinion testimony
and SCJ with respect to their effectiveness in assessing the defendant as a continued
threat, thus perceiving them as equally influential in their evaluation. No other
significant effects were observed.
Influence of Expert on Risk Potential for Sexually Violent Crime
Influence of expert testimony. In order to test the moderating effects of attributional
complexity on our risk-potential items, we performed two separate three-way
ANCOVAs: Expert Testimony (Clinical Opinion v. Actuarial v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult
v. Minor) x AC (Low v. High). Our continuous measurement variables of future
dangerousness and need for commitment were selected as covariates. Preliminary
analysis revealed non-significant effects of our moderator variable AC on each of these
items: p values = .29 and .45 (two-tailed independent samples t-tests), demonstrating
the suitability of this analysis for our purposes. Results of the first ANCOVA indicated a
significant expert testimony x AC interaction on the item: “How much of your opinion on
Mr. Cooke’s sexual-risk potential was influenced by the expert?” F(2, 231) = 4.62, p =
.011, hp2 = .04. High AC participants in the clinical-opinion-testimony condition relied
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the least on expert testimony when evaluating the defendant’s sexual-risk potential and
the most in the SCJ condition. Alternatively, when evaluating the defendant’s sexualrisk potential, low AC participants relied most on clinical-opinion testimony and least on
actuarial testimony. Figure 2 displays this interaction effect.
Figure 2: Expert Testimony x Attributional Complexity (AC) Interaction on Expert
Influence

4.9
4.7
4.5
4.3

Low AC

4.1

High AC

3.9
3.7
3.5
Actuarial

SCJ

Clinical Opinion

A main effect of testimony was also found on this item: F(2, 231) = 5.69, hp2 = .05. Post
hoc comparisons revealed participant-jurors exposed to SCJ testimony indicated that
their opinion regarding risk potential was greatly influenced by the expert (M = 4.52, SD
= .97). This differed significantly from the actuarial condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.19).
Clinical-opinion testimony did not differ from either SCJ or actuarial (M = 4.17, SD = .89)
Recidivism Items
We assessed participants’ perceptions of the likelihood of recidivism through two
separate items: “If the defendant does/does not participate in treatment, how likely is it
that he will commit a sexual crime in the future?” Based on the bivariate correlation r =
.41, p< .001, (one-tailed) we performed a MANOVA. The resulting Expert Testimony
(Clinical Opinion v. Actuarial v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) x AC (Low v. High)
MANOVA found a significant effect of testimony on each item: Wilks’ Lambda = .858:
F(4, 464) = 9.26, p < .001. For the likelihood of recidivism with treatment, tests of
between-subjects effects revealed participants were least likely to believe the defendant
would commit a sexual crime in the future with treatment in Actuarial condition (M =
2.85, SD = 1.10). This differed significantly from both Clinical-Opinion (M = 3.59, SD =
.91) and SCJ testimony (M = 3.617, SD = .93). For the likelihood of recidivism without
treatment, participants were least likely to believe the defendant would a commit a
sexual crime in the future without treatment in the Actuarial condition (M = 4.79, SD =
1.11). This differed significantly from Clinical Opinion (M = 5.32, SD = 1.21). SCJ did
not differ from either condition.
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Expert Credibility
An Expert Testimony (Clinical Opinion v. Actuarial v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor)
x AC (Low v. High) ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of expert credibility.
We found a victim type x AC interaction approaching significance: F(1, 233) = 3.43, p =
.065, hp2 = .01. Inspection of the means reveals high AC participants rated the expert
as more credible in the child condition (M = 4.98, SD = 1.01) compared to low AC
participants (M = 4.61, SD = .91). However, for both high and low AC participants these
ratings were lower than the Adult condition: high AC (Adult: M = 5.02, SD = .98), low AC
participants: (Adult: M = 5.08, SD = .96). Figure 3 displays this interaction finding.
Figure 3: Victim Type x Attributional Complexity (AC) Interaction on Expert Credibility
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p = .065
The main effect of victim type reveals higher ratings of expert credibility in the adult
condition than in the child condition: F(1, 233) = 4.62, p = .033, hp2 = .02: (M = 5.05, SD
= .91 v. M = 4.80, SD = .93, respectively). The main effect of testimony was marginally
significant: F(2, 233) = 2.85, p = .059, hp2 = .01. This result was not strong enough to
distinguish any statistically significant between-group differences in post-hoc analysis,
however SCJ expert ratings were the highest (M = 5.13), Clinical Opinion (M = 4.84)
and Actuarial (M = 4.81).
Gender Effects
To test whether participant gender influenced responses to our dependent measures,
two three-way ANOVAs were conducted: Expert Testimony (Clinical Opinion v. Actuarial
v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) x Gender (Male v. Female). A main effect of
gender was found on the belief that the defendant should be placed in a clinical facility:
F(1, 233) = 6.38, p = .012, hp2 = .03. Females were significantly more likely to believe
the defendant should be committed than males were: (M = 5.06, SD = .94 v. M = 4.73,
SD = 1.04, respectively). Similarly, females were significantly more likely to view the
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defendant as a continued threat to society than males were: F(1, 233) = 9.13, p = .003,
hp2 = .04: (M = 4.87, SD = .83 v. M = 4.50, SD = 1.03, respectively). No gender effects
were observed on our dependent measures of expert credibility, likelihood of reoffending with/without treatment, and opinion of sexual-risk potential influenced by
expert testimony.
Discussion
The goal of the current study was to examine the effect of expert testimony, attributional
complexity, and victim type on perceptions of dangerousness and need for commitment
in the context of an SVP trial. Considering the importance of determining the most
efficient form of expert testimony in this context, we felt it was essential to add to the
literature comparing structured-clinical-judgment testimony (SCJ) to both actuarial and
clinical-opinion testimony. In addition, in view of the research demonstrating that
individuals with complex attributional schemata are more efficient information
processors than are those with relatively simple schemata, we expected to observe
differences in participants’ use of expert testimony as a function of attributional
complexity. If so, this result could add to the discussion of the importance of assessing
information processing in SVP hearings (see Lieberman et al., 2007). Our decision to
examine victim type was largely based on the relatively few studies investigating this
factor in the context of an SVP trial (e.g., Guy & Edens, 2006). By gauging the level of
seriousness of sexual assault on an adult versus a minor victim, we expected to
observe differences in perceptions of dangerousness and need for commitment.
Finally, we investigated the moderating effects of participant gender in considering the
recent emergence of this factor as critical in understanding perceptions of
dangerousness (Foels & Reid, 2010; Guy & Edens, 2006; 2003; Lieberman et al.,
2007).
Overall, our participants did not indicate a strong preference for structured-clinical
judgment (SCJ) testimony over clinical-opinion and actuarial testimony when evaluating
need for commitment and future dangerousness. Specifically, participants perceived
clinical-opinion testimony and SCJ testimony as equally influential when assessing
future dangerousness. This finding supports Lieberman et al., (2007), who found no
significant differences in dangerousness ratings between clinical testimony and guidedprofessional-judgment testimony regardless of individuals’ processing mode. Similar to
dangerousness findings, in the current study, SCJ testimony did not differ from either
clinical or actuarial testimony on perceptions of need for commitment. However, victim
type appeared to moderate the relation between expert testimony and perceptions of
need for commitment. Participants were most likely to believe the defendant should be
placed in a clinical facility in the clinical-opinion testimony and least likely to believe the
defendant should be placed in a facility in the actuarial testimony but only when the
victim was an adult. We also found that participants did not distinguish between clinical
and SCJ testimony when evaluating the defendant’s sexual-risk potential, rating each as
equally influential. Finally, we did not observe the same type of overwhelming response
to need for commitment when the victim was a child that was demonstrated by Guy and
Edens (2006). In this study, participants were exposed to two sexual-assault scenarios

OAJFP – SSN 1948-5115 – Volume 5. 2013

Future Dangerousness

71

involving a child. This may have increased the likelihood that participants would
respond in such an intense manner. In our study, participants were exposed to one of
two sexual-assault scenarios in which the victim was either an adult or minor, thus
providing one explanation for the differences in victim type.
The effects of SCJ testimony were less ambiguous however, when examining the
moderating effects of attributional complexity. When evaluating the extent to which
participants relied on expert testimony in determining a defendant’s sexual-risk
potential, high AC participants in the clinical-opinion testimony condition reported the
least reliance on expert testimony and the greatest reliance in the SCJ condition.
Alternatively, low AC participants relied the most on clinical-opinion testimony and least
on actuarial testimony. It is interesting that we found that high AC participants’ opinions
of the defendant’s sexual-risk potential were less influenced by the case facts when
exposed to clinical-opinion testimony and most influenced when exposed to actuarial
testimony. Low AC participants exposed to clinical testimony reported their opinion of
risk potential was greatly influenced by the facts of the case and least influenced by
SCJ testimony. It appears that, for high AC participants, the data-driven testimony was
found to be more useful when determining sexual-risk potential. This result supports
researchers who find that attributionally complex individuals not only seek out but also
apply more useful information when determining causal attributions than attributionally
simple individuals do (Murphy, 1994). Overall, these findings provide support for the
moderating effects of AC in the context of an SVP hearing and offer insights into how
individual differences in attributional schemata contribute to our understanding of
perceptions of SVPs.
Participants relied on actuarial testimony when evaluating the likelihood of recidivism,
regardless of opportunity for treatment, thus indicating the importance of utilizing static
factors in favor of intervening treatments when determining risk. Considering that our
sample consisted entirely of undergraduate students, this result mirrors Krauss and
colleagues (2010) who found students were significantly more influenced by actuarial
testimony than by clinical testimony. The researchers attributed this to the rational
cognitive processing style of students. It is interesting that, in our study, actuarial
testimony differed significantly from both clinical and SCJ testimony when evaluating the
likelihood of committing a sexual crime in the future with treatment. In addition, higher
ratings of expert credibility were found in the adult condition than in the child condition.
At first glance, this finding may seem counterintuitive; however, it may appear that,
when offending against adults, we need to rely on experts to determine what is deviant.
Alternatively, we may rely significantly less on expert testimony when determining
deviant behavior against a child. Finally, females were more likely to believe the
defendant should be committed as well as a continued threat than were males, a
modest result considering no gender effects were observed on our measures of expert
credibility, likelihood of re-offending with/without treatment, and opinion of sexual-risk
potential influenced by expert testimony. Although this result mirrors Guy and Edens
(2003) who found females significantly more likely to commit a defendant described as
a psychopath than males were, more research is needed to examine gender differences
in expert testimony regarding risk potential.
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Limitations and Future Research
In spite of our attempts to balance validity issues with implementing a tightly controlled
research design, we recognize that the current study is limited with respect to specific
validity issues. To start, ecological validity is hampered by the use of written trial
transcripts as stimulus materials as opposed to videotaped or live testimony. In
addition, although we attempted to provide consistency and strength among the experttestimony conditions, the potential exists for different expert testimony to influence our
measures. We also recognize the limitations to generalizability through the use of an
undergraduate student sample.
Although our sample consisted of jury-eligible
individuals, the use of a more representative sample of jury-eligible community
members is preferred. Finally, a more comprehensive examination of this topic would
include a deliberation facet (Sommer, Horowitz, & Bourgeois, 2001; Stevenson, et al.,
2010). In the present study, however, we attempted to minimize certain validity issues
by including the definition of SVPs as listed in the Massachusetts statute. In addition,
we formed our expert-testimony conditions to include both direct and cross-examination
of the expert. Nevertheless, it is important to be cognizant of limitations when
generalizing findings from simulated trial studies, such as the current study, to the more
realistic aspects of jury trials.
To our knowledge, only one study has empirically examined perceptions of the relative
efficacy of clinical-opinion, actuarial, and structured-clinical-judgment (SCJ) expert
testimony in the context of future dangerousness and civil commitment (Lieberman, et
al., 2007). In this vein, the current study offers important findings when evaluating the
most influential form of expert testimony in civil-commitment hearings of SVPs. Future
studies addressing expert testimony in the context of SVP should continue to assess
individual difference characteristics in light of our findings as well as the findings of other
researchers (Krauss et al., 2004). Considering the strong moderating effect of ACS, we
suggest future research assess the seven specific constructs present in the 28-item
measure of attributional complexity. Finally, in the current study we assessed the
defendant as a moderate risk. We suggest that future studies vary risk for recidivism as
well as the level of seriousness of sexual assault charges. Overall, this study provides
important evidence into how contextual as well as individual difference factors
contribute to our understanding of SVPs.
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Appendix
Mr. Joseph Cooke is currently thirty-eight years old. Joseph lived with his parents and
brother in Arkham, Massachusetts and attended Arkham High School graduating in
1988. He moved out of his home at age 18. Joseph worked at a local machine shop
immediately out of high school and began living with his girlfriend Jessica Rojas. He
and Jessica continued living together for three years when, in 1991, they ended their
relationship due to Joseph’s infidelity. Joseph moved out of Jessica’s apartment and
began renting his own apartment in town.
In 1992, Joseph Cooke began working part time at the Gold’s Gym in Arkham. Joseph
was frequently disciplined at work for being lazy. Several customers complained that
Mr. Cooke was sneaking into the women’s locker room. Gold’s Gym contacted the local
Police Department, who investigated Mr. Cooke and arrested him on charges of
voyeurism. Mr. Cooke pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to two-year
probation in 1993.
In the summer of 1995, Joseph Cooke started working for Allied Landscaping. In July,
he started working on Lora Jacoby’s lawn.
Lora Jacoby, 30, lived with her
sister/daughter Diane, 28/9, in her home. During his time there, Mr. Cooke entered into
the home several times for lunch breaks. Mr. Cooke worked at the Jacoby home until
August of 1995. He later stated that he would return several times a week until the
autumn of 1995 to watch Lora Jacoby and her sister.
On the evening of October 14, 1995, at approximately 11:45 pm, Joseph Cooke
returned to the Jacoby home. Using a crowbar, Mr. Cooke entered through the kitchen
door. He went up the stairs to the second floor, where he entered the room of Diane.
Once inside the room, Mr. Cooke showed Diane a knife and told her that he would not
harm her if she remained quiet. Mr. Cook then inserted his fingers into Diane’s vagina.
Lora Jacoby, sleeping in her first floor bedroom, was not awakened by the assault. Mr.
Cooke fled from the house through the kitchen door.
The Arkham Police Department was able to obtain fingerprints from the kitchen door
and the doorknob of Diane’s bedroom doors. The fingerprints matched those taken of
Joseph Cooke after his previous arrest. Joseph Cooke was apprehended three days
later. He accepted a plea bargain and was convicted of two counts of sexual assault
and breaking and entering. Joseph Cooke was sentenced to twelve years in prison in
1996.
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